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ABSTRACT 
The main objective of the present study is to estimate the extent to which the RDP 
investment support has a complementary or a substitutionary effect on farm investments. In 
order to answer this question, we attempt to quantify the potential deadweight loss by 
estimating the extent to which the RDP beneficiaries would have undertaken comparable 
investments also without the investment support. We find that the deadweight loss of the RDP 
is close to 100%, implying that firm investment would have been undertaken also without the 
support. These results suggest that capital market distortions are not significant in Schleswig-
Holstein. Similarly, no evidence was found that, due to programme support, farms would have 
brought forward their investments planned originally in a later period, suggesting no evidence 
of inter-temporal substitution of investments. These results are new, as the deadweight loss 
and its conditionality have not been studied in the context of the RDP in Germany before. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Investment support to farms is one of the main measures within the Rural Development 
Programme (RDP) and an essential component of the productivity enhancing strategy within the 
Common Agricultural Policy in the EU. As part of the RDP, more than 11 billion Euro (representing 
11.5 percent of the total RDP budget) have been spent for supporting farm investment in the 
current financial programming period (FPP) 2007-2013. The RDP investment support grants are 
used to support private investment for improving farm productivity and competiveness, e.g. 
through innovation and adaption of new technologies (European Commission 2012). One of the key 
objectives of the EU investment support is to promote investments that otherwise would not have 
been undertaken, which in the EU policy implementation guidelines (European Commission 2006) 
is referred to as the principle of additionality.  
A key question related to public support in general, and to the EU investment support in particular, 
is the extent to which the public support actually stimulates private investment, and what are the 
second order induced effects on productivity, employment, environment, etc. Investment support 
can have either a complementary or a substitutionary effect on firm investment. In the former 
case, investment support policies would increase the total farm investment compared to no policy 
support scenario. Several studies find that investment support induces additional investment of 
supported firms (Harris and Trainor 2005; Pellegrini and Centra 2006; Duch, Montolio and 
Mediavilla 2009; Gadd, Hansson and Månsson 2009). In the latter case, investment support would 
trigger either intra-firm or inter-firm adjustments in firm investment behaviour but with no impact 
on the overall investment behaviour. Indeed, several studies do not find positive effects (Bronzini 
and de Blasio, 2006; Koester and Senior, 2010). Similarly, the job creation effect of capital 
subsidies is found to be insignificant (Gabe and Kraybill, 2002), and the impact on efficiency and 
productivity is found to be negligible or even negative (Beason and Weinstein 1996; Lee 1996; 
Bagella and Becchetti 1998; Bergström 2000; Harris and Robinson 2004; Bernini and Pellegrini 
2011). Thus, despite the fact that additionality is an important condition for public support and a 
measure of public support’s success, the available empirical evidence is not conclusive yet. 
The main objective of the present paper is to estimate the extent to which the RDP investment 
support has a complementary or a substitutionary effect on farm investments. In order to answer 
this question, we attempt to quantify the potential deadweight loss by estimating the extent to 
which the RDP beneficiaries would have undertaken comparable investments also without the RDP 
support. As a robustness check, we also estimate the impact of the RDP on private off-farm 
spending (the so called leverage effect), and the inter-firm substitution effects of the RDP 
investment support, attempting to account for the potential impact of the support on non-
beneficiaries. 
In the empirical analyses we employ the propensity score matching (PSM) approach, which allows 
us to address several important sources of bias, from which many previous studies suffer. In 
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particular, by employing the PSM estimator we are able to address the selection bias, the 
simultaneity bias, and functional form misspecification. We base our estimation on a sample of 
1333 farms from Schleswig-Holstein region (Germany) for the period 2001-2008.  
We find that the deadweight loss of the RDP on farm investment is around 100%, implying that 
firm investment would have been undertaken also without the support. According to the theoretical 
hypothesis, these results suggest that farms in Schleswig-Holstein are not credit constrained, and 
hence do not significantly increase their investment level, when investment support becomes 
available. These results imply that credit market distortions are not significant. In contrast, the 
RDP investment support represents an income transfer to farm households by significantly 
increasing private off-farm spending. Further, given that we cover a 7 year period from 2001 to 
2007, farms may have brought forward their investments. However, our results do not support the 
inter-temporal investment substitution hypothesis. These results are new, as the deadweight loss 
has not been studied in the context of the RDP in Germany before.  
 
2 FIRM-LEVEL INVESTMENT SUPPORT 
2.1 Farm investment support in the EU and in the study region 
The ultimate objective of the RDP is to promote growth, employment, environment, output 
diversification in rural areas and to reduce disparities vis-à-vis non-agricultural sectors in terms of 
regional income per capita and rates of employment. The RDP represents the second pillar support 
measures within the CAP.  The RDP grants are not automatically granted to all farms but are 
subject to a project approval. Only those farms, which submit a project and are selected according 
the selection criteria (including additionality), are granted the RDP. This has important implication 
for our empirical analysis. First, because not all farms receive the RDP, we can build a 
counterfactual of non-supported farms. Second, a selection bias may emerge, because farms self-
select themselves into those who apply for the RDP, and those who do not. Similarly, the selection 
procedure may favour certain types of farms. Both selection effects favour more dynamic and 
productive farms, because the selection criteria include economic viability, adequate occupational 
skills and competences, and minimum thresholds of supported investment, etc. In addition, 
beneficiaries need to comply with minimum standards regarding the environment, hygiene and 
animal welfare. 
The RDP support can be regrouped into three main areas of rural development: restructuring and 
competitiveness (representing 38% of the total RDP expenditures); environment and land 
management (representing 52% of the RDP expenditures); and rural economy and communities 
(representing 10% of the RDP expenditures) (Kantor 2012). In the present study, we focus on the 
restructuring and competitiveness measures of the RDP, provided for investment support, the main 
objective of which is to support investments aiming at improving the economic performance of 
farms. Investment support was the third largest item within the 2000-2006 FPP (after agri-
environment measure and less favoured area payments), representing 9% of the total 
expenditures (Kantor 2012). 
In Schleswig-Holstein (SH) the investment support for modernisation of agricultural farms was 
implemented under the Agrarinvestitionsförderungsprogramm (AFP). The main mechanism of the 
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AFP was a subsidy of the commercial interest rate for loans on firm investment (175 000 EUR to 
500 000 EUR) carried out in the milk, beef, pork, horticultural and the agro-tourism sectors. The 
subsidy of the commercial interest rate (approximately 13% of the eligible investment volume) was  
provided to eligible farms for the period of 10 to 20 years on an average amount of 23 000-30 000 
EUR/farm. During the years 2000-2006, the total subsidies provided under the AFP reached 
approximately 29.7 Mill EUR distributed between 1513 farms (net investment volume of 250 Mill 
EUR). The largest part of the programme budget (approximately 80%) was provided for farm 
inventory (buildings) investment support, mainly in the milk and beef sectors. The rest was split up 
for investment support (including purchases of machinery or investments in alternative sources of 
energy) among the pork sector, the agro-tourism sector and the horticulture sector. Specific 
eligibility criteria, such as investment volume higher than 175 000 EUR, and personal income up to 
90 000 EUR per person or 120 000 EUR per couple, excluded the smallest and the largest 
agricultural farms from this programme.  
2.2 RDP investment support in the literature 
The sizable amount of firm level investment support has generated large interest between policy 
makers and researchers. Kirchweger and Kantelhardt (2012) apply the PSM estimator to estimate 
the effects from the agricultural investment support programme in Austria on the farm income. 
Their results suggest that farm income of treated dairy farms increases by about 1,200 Euros 
compared to the control group. 
Ortner (2012) estimate the effects of investment support measures in Austria. Using farm-level 
data, and PSM and DID estimators, they estimate the impact of farm modernisation (measure 
M121), diversification (excluding bio-energy projects, measure M311b), and small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs, measure M312). They find that due to its positive effect on Gross Value Added, 
investment support renders private investments profitable.  
Ratinger et al (2012) estimate the economic and other effects of the measure 121 “Modernisation 
of Agricultural Holdings” of the RDP 2007-2013 on the Czech farms. Employing the PSM estimator 
they attempt to assess what would have happened if the supported producers did not participate in 
the programme and then comparing the result indicators? The quantitative analysis of programme 
effects is complemented by a qualitative survey on 20 farms, which received the investment 
support between 2008 and 2010. The quantitative assessment showed significant benefits of the 
investment support in terms of business expansion and productivity improvements. They also find 
a significant deadweight loss of the RDP support. However, since it does not take into account post 
accession restructuring of the sector and multiannual and multi-enterprise character of investment 
at the farm level, these latter results may be incomplete. 
Salvioni and Sciulli (2011) use a conditional difference-in-difference PSM estimator, and a balanced 
panel for 2003-2007 drawn from the FADN Italian sample to evaluate the impact at the farm level 
of the implementation of the first Italian RDP. They find that, on average, farms receiving at least 
some RDP increased the employment of family labour, while they did not increase the total labour 
on-farm employment. In addition, they experienced an increase in labour profitability and in added 
value, even though the estimate significance varies across alternative matching methods. Their 
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findings suggest that the implementation of the RDP in Italy produced a positive direct impact on 
rural GDP, while it did not prove to be effective in terms of rural employment growth. 
As noted above, from a policy perspective, one of the key targets of investment support is the 
concept of additionality. The principle of additionality means that the EU investment support should 
add on but not replace the equivalent expenditure undertaken in the absence of the support. 
However, the previous evidence about the RDP impact on farm investment is inconclusive, and 
further research is needed in this area to better understand the investment response of firms and 
the implications for complementary/substitutionary effect of policy interventions. Therefore, we 
start with a theoretical analysis, which allows us to better interpret, structure and understand the 
empirical results.  
3 THEORETICAL HYPOTHESIS 
Investment support can have either a complementary or a substitutionary effect on firm 
investment. To identify the additionality effect, one needs to investigate intra-firm and inter-
firm adjustments to investment support. Whereas intra-firm adjustments capture adjustments 
in investment decision at firm level, inter-firm adjustments reflect changes in investment 
patterns across firms as, due to general equilibrium effects, investment support may cause a 
substitution of investments from non-subsidised firms to subsidised firms. The intra-firm 
substitution reflects changes in investment behaviour within firm, which might be caused by 
interaction of support with firms' access to financial resources (e.g. credit constraint), and by 
inter-temporal relocation of investments. The inter-firm substitution results from relocation of 
investment among firms, i.e. it may cause a crowding out of investment of non-subsidised 
firms. 
3.1 Intra-firm substitution of investment support 
Brandsma, Kancs and Ciaian (2013) provide a theoretical analysis of intra-firm adjustment to 
investment support. According to their theoretical results, the main factors determining the 
impact of investment support on farm performance are the level of competition and market 
imperfections. Under perfect competition, investment support does not increase firm’s 
investments, because the support cannot improve investment opportunities of firms. The public 
investment support fully substitutes private investment and hence represents a pure income 
transfer from taxpayers to firms, i.e. public investment support results in a deadweight loss; 
firms undertake the same level of investments with and without the support. In contrast, in 
imperfectly competitive markets, the support may be complementary to firm investments. For 
example, if firms are credit constrained, they do not have sufficient financial resources to fully 
exploit all investment opportunities in the absence of the support. The investment support 
allows firms to expand investment, and to exploit the otherwise unused profitable investment 
opportunities. The results of Brandsma, Kancs and Ciaian (2013) suggest that investment 
support policies will more likely increase firm investment in imperfectly competitive markets. 
Due to the nature of production and agriculture specific risks, the agricultural sector is 
perceived to have significant credit problems (Barry and Robison 2001). Studies show that this 
may also be the case in developed countries such as EU and the USA (Blancard et al. 2006; 
Lee and Chambers 1986; Färe, Grosskopf, and Lee 1990).  
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Brandsma, Kancs and Ciaian (2013) use a static framework. However, the investment support 
policies may have substitutionary effect on investments within firm even in perfectly 
competitive markets, if one considers a dynamic context. According to Bergström (2000), 
investment support may displace private investments due to inter-temporal substitution. I.e., 
firms may bring forward investments originally planned for the post intervention period. As 
shown by Abel (1982), a temporary investment subsidy gives firms strong incentives to invest 
during the investment support period (Auerbach and Hines 1988 and Adda and Cooper 2000). 
Bronzini and de Blasio (2006) show that inter-temporal substitution considerably affects the 
pattern of supported firm investment in Italy. They find that a potential effect of investment 
support may boost investment during the support period, at the cost of reducing investment 
subsequently. In this case, a positive effect of investment subsidies is not a proof of 
complementarity effect as, without the support, the same investment would have been 
undertaken in the following period. Similalry, Cannari, D'Aurizio and de Blasio (2006) find that 
inter-temporal substitution is significant: 64.2 percent of firms that would have invested less 
without subsidies declared that they would have invested in the following periods. Cannari, 
D'Aurizio and de Blasio also find that inter-temporal substitution is more important for firms in 
traditional sectors. 
3.2 Inter-firm substitution of investment support 
Inter-firm adjustments to investment support occur when a given programme affects 
(positively or negatively) also others than the supported farms. The inter-firm effect belongs to 
the indirect general equilibrium or macro-economic effects, and is defined as the effect 
occurring in favour of supported farms at the expense of farms that do not participate in a 
given programme. For example, due to the RDP support, factor prices (e.g. land rents, loan 
interest rate) may increase; or regional producer prices may decrease, by crowding out non-
participants. Subsidised firms may receive some of the investment opportunities that non-
subsidised firms would have had in absence of the investment support (Harris and Trainor 
2005 and Lee 1996). Empirical evidence of inter-firm crowding out of investment support is 
provided e.g. by Bronzini and de Blasio (2006). Adopting the difference-in-difference 
estimation approach, they find that the supported firms have substantially increased their 
investments compared to firms, whose applications have been rejected. 
Firm-level investment support may affect both regional input, factor and output  prices. The 
empirical evidence of capital price increase due to investment support programmes is provided 
e.g. by Goolsbee (1998), who finds that investment incentives have little impact because, 
through higher prices, a significant share of programme support leaks to the suppliers of 
capital. Inter-firm substitution is particularly important when the market is small, and when 
firms demand similar inputs and supply similar outputs (Rosenthal and Strange 2004). Bronzini 
and de Blasio (2006) find that that inter-firm substitution is more pronounced for firms located 
in the same area and competing in the same sector. 
4 ECONOMETRIC APPROACH 
4.1 Propensity score matching 
The impact of investment support is the causal effect of the support ('treatment') on an outcome 
variable of interest ('investment'). For each individual farm there is a potential outcome with 
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treatment, denoted Y1, and another potential outcome without treatment, denoted Y0. The 
treatment causal effect of the support is the difference between these two quantities: Y1 – Y0. A 
common empirical application of the treatment effect consists of estimating the average impact of 
programme participation on farms that participated in the programme, the average treatment on 
the treated (ATT): 
(1) )1()1()1( 0101 =−===−= DYEDYEDYYEATT   
where D is a binary variable (0-1) and indicates whether farm i participated (D=1), or did not 
participate (D=0) in the programme. 
The ATT captures the effect of programme on participants (Heckman and Robb, 1985; Heckman, 
1997; Smith, 2000; Smith and Todd, 2003). Although, the ATT is generally applicable to provide 
answers about support effects on firms that participated in the programme, the empirical 
estimation of the ATT is not straightforward. While E(Y1| D =1) can be easily identified from the 
data on programme participants, the expected value of potential outcome in case of non-
participation, E(Y0|D =1), i.e. the counterfactual mean in outcome of those who participated in the 
programme, cannot be directly observed. For this reason, one has to choose a substitute for the 
unobservable E(Y0|D =1) in order to estimate the ATT. 
One could use the non-participants directly as an adequate control group:  
(2) )0()1( 01 === DYEDYE   
However, condition (2) is likely to hold only in randomised experiments (Caliendo and Hujer, 
2005). In most of non-experimental studies the estimation of the ATT using the differences in 
outcome means of programme participants and non-participants results in a selection bias. The 
selection bias arises because the means of Y0 for programme participants (D=1) and Y0 for non-
participants (D=0) may differ systematically, even in the absence of the programme. The selection 
bias is particularly relevant for investment support granted under the RDP programme. Farms self-
select themselves into those who apply for the support, as well as criteria used in the selection 
procedure may favour granting the support to certain types of farms.   
The ATT can also be defined conditional on P(Z):  
(3) )1,)(,()( 01 ===−= DpZPZXYYEZATT   
where X is a set of variables representing the pre-exposure attributes (covariates) of farms, Z is a 
subset of X representing a set observable covariates, P is a probability distribution of observed 
covariance Z. Given that (1) and (3) are equivalent, the latter formulation will be used for 
calculating the effects of the RDP support. 
The most suitable method used for estimation is the matching estimator (Heckman and Navarro-
Lozano, 2004). Matching of comparable farms may be difficult, if the set of conditioning variables Z 
is large, due to the “curse of dimensionality” (problem of empty cells) of the conditioning problem 
(Zhao, 2005; Todd, 2006; Black and Smith, 2004): 2 as the number of observable characteristics in 
the group of programme participants increases linearly, the number of necessary observations in 
the control group increases exponentially. Moreover, matching on all the covariates using a 
                                                            
2 For example with just 20 binary covariates there are 220 covariate patterns (1.04 mill possibilities). 
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distance measure, which effectively regards all interactions among the X covariates as equally 
important, is not efficient (Gu and Rosenbaum, 1993; Rubin and Thomas, 1996). 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that the dimensionality of the conditioning problem can 
be significantly reduced by implementing matching methods through the use of balancing scores 
b(Z), i.e. functions of the relevant observed covariates, Z, such that the conditional distribution of 
Z independent of the assignment into treatment. One possible balancing score is the propensity 
score, i.e. the probability of participating in a programme given observed characteristics Z. 
For random variables Y and Z and for discrete variable D, the propensity score can be defined as 
the conditional probability of participating in a programme given pre-programme characteristics, Z: 
(4) )()1Pr()( ZDEZDZp ===   
According to Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), if participation in a programme is random conditional 
on Z, it is also random conditional on p(Z): 
(5) [ ] [ ])1Pr(,,()1Pr(, YDYZYDEEZDYDE ===   
so that E(D|Y,Z) = E(D|Z) = Pr(D = 1|Z), which implies that E[D|Y, Pr(D = 1)|Z)] = E[D|Pr(D = 
1|Z)], where Pr(D = 1|Z) is a propensity score. 
This implies that, when outcomes are independent of programme participation conditional on Z, 
they are also independent of participation conditional on the propensity score, Pr(D = 1|Z). Hence, 
the conditional independence remains valid, if we use the propensity score p(Z) instead of 
covariates Z or X.  
According to Winship and Morgan, (1999), the propensity score contains all the information needed 
to create a balanced evaluation design.  Estimating a conditional participation probability by 
employing a parametric method, such as probit or logit, or semi-parametrically, (which converges 
faster than the non-parametric), reduces the dimensionality of the matching problem substantially 
to one dimension only, i.e. the univariate propensity score. An important feature of this method is 
that after the individuals have been matched, the unmatched comparison individuals can easily be 
separated out and are not directly used in the estimation of programme effects. 
The Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimator for the ATT can be written as: 
(6) [ ][ ] [ ])(,0()(,1(1)( 01 ZpDYEZpDYEDZpEPSM =−===τ   
which corresponds to the mean difference in outcomes over the common support, appropriately 
weighted by the propensity score distribution of programme participants (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 
2005). 
4.2 Difference-in-Differences PSM estimator 
While the PSM can be applied to control for selection bias on observables at the beginning of the 
programme, a combination of PSM with DID methods (conditional DID estimator) allows for a 
better controlling of selection bias in both observables and unobservables. The combined PSM and 
DID method serves as a feasible estimator in cases, where the outcome data on programme 
participants and non-participants are available for both “before” and “after” periods (t’ and t, 
respectively). The PSM-DID measures the impact of the RDP support by using differences between 
comparable to each other programme participants (D=1) and non-participants (D=0) before and 
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after the support. The observed changes over time for the matched (using PSM) programme non-
participants are assumed to be appropriate counterfactual for programme participants.  
In general, the PSM-DID estimator can be described as: 
(7) nDYDYDYDY it
i
itit
i
it /)]0()1([)]0()1([DID-PSM '' ⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ =−=−=−== ∑∑  
where )0()1( =−= DYDY itit  is the difference in mean outcomes between the i participants and the i 
matched comparison units after the access to the RDP and )0()1( '' =−= DYDY itit  is difference in the 
mean outcome between the i participants and i matched comparison units in period 0 (prior to the 
programme).  
Compared to a conventional DID estimator, the PSM-DID estimator eliminates differences in initial 
conditions (observable heterogeneity) of both groups (programme participants and non-
participants) that could influence subsequent changes over time.3 In the present study, we expect 
that application of the PSM-DID estimator to measurement of the RDP support would improve the 
estimation results compared to a standard PSM estimator (e.g. for estimation of the ATT) that uses 
only the post-intervention data. 
4.3 Two-stage approach to estimate the deadweight loss 
While the PSM-DID method is particularly useful for estimation of the RDP effects at farm level, the 
applicability of a standard PSM method (based on estimation of a logit function) necessitates an 
assumption regarding the absence of inter-firm adjustments (or general equilibrium effects) to 
investment support. In other words, the standard PSM estimates are only valid under an 
assumption of no indirect effects of a given RDP on non-supported farms. The presence of inter-
firm adjustments would bias the deadweight effects of the support, as non-beneficiaries (i.e. a 
control group) might also be affected, thus potentially showing a different performance relative to 
a situation without the support. 
To overcome this problem, we employ a two-stage approach. First, we perform a regional analysis 
in order to check whether non-beneficiaries are affected by the support by estimating inter-firm 
effects of the investment support at the level of non-supported farms. As a measure of farm 
performance we use a set of commonly applied result indicators suggested in EC guidelines (i.e. 
Gross Value Added, employment, profits, etc.). Second, we analyse and test a potential 
deadweight loss by comparing the supported and non-supported firms, and by dropping the 
programme affected non-supported farms from the sample.  
We start by estimating inter-firm effects of programme non-beneficiaries by applying a standard 
PSM estimator, and by comparing the performance of non-supported farms in regions where the 
intensity of the AFP exposure was high (high probability of positive/negative effects from a given 
programme; P=1) with the performance of comparable non-supported farms in other regions 
characterised by a very low AFP intensity (P=0). The first group of farms in high AFP regions 
represents those “unintentionally exposed” whereas the second group (in other regions) captures 
non-affected farms. The obtained differences in performance of both groups (non-beneficiaries) are 
statistically tested. A significant difference in the estimated ATT-DID between both groups of non-
supported farms would indicate the existence of inter-firm adjustments to investment support. 
                                                            
3 A similar methodology was used by Ravallion, 2004. 
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Insignificant difference would indicate an absence of inter-firm adjustments to investment support. 
Given results from the first stage, we correct our sample by excluding non-supported farms found 
to be affected by the AFP.  
At the second stage, i.e. after dropping all non-beneficiary farms affected by the programme, we 
analyse potential deadweight loss from the AFP. The deadweight loss is measured by comparing 
the performance of supported farms vis-à-vis non affected non supported farms. At stage-2 a 
standard PSM method is applied, whereby a logit function using the same covariates as in Stage 1 
is re-estimated based on a new (corrected) number of observations (i.e. after cleaning the 
database by dropping from the dataset of potential controls those indirectly affected by the AFP). 
The ATT is estimated before the programme (t') and after the programme (t), using farm asset 
value as relevant result indicator measuring the deadweight effect. It is expected that in  the case 
of zero or small deadweight loss, the result indicator, e.g. asset value of the supported farms 
would increase much stronger compared to the control groups, 4 i.e. the differences in DID-ATT 
would be significant. In contrast, the presence of deadweight loss would result in similar 
differences in DID-ATT between the supported and non-supported farms. 
According to our knowledge, in other empirical studies which applied PSM method for estimation of 
investment support effects (see section 2.2.), the possible general equilibrium effects have not 
been accounted for. This may have lead to additional bias in empirical results presented so far. 
 
5 RESULTS 
5.1 Data  
The balanced panel we employ in this study covers 7 years (2001-2007) for the Schleswig-Holstein 
region in Germany. The choice of the period 2001-2007 was determined by the availability of data 
and in order to cover the period at the start of the 2000-2006 RDP (i.e. 2001) and one years after 
(i.e. 2007) the programme.5 The main data source is farm bookkeeping data comprised of 
approximately 10 500 farms for the bookkeeping year 2000/2001 and 3 900 farms for 2007/2008). 
In addition, for specific comparisons approximately 400 datasets from “Testbetriebe” (part of the 
FADN data set) are used. 
Using information about the general- and measure-specific conditions of programme participation, 
the potentially eligible farms are identified and selected from the available data set. This group of 
                                                            
4 In the empirical work it is important to identify control group as similar as possible to supported farms. Yet, 
some farms (programme non-participants) irrespectively on whether support is provided or not, may not be 
willing to invest, due to a number of reasons, e.g. lack of farm successor. As the latter factor is usually an 
unobservable, i.e. cannot be derived from micro- bookkeeping data, it would be inappropriate to compare farms 
which received investment support with all those others which did not invest. In order to circumvent this 
problem we selected into potential control group only those farms which were “willing to invest”, i.e. those 
which in a given period undertook analogous investment (i.e. modernisation of buildings) yet, at various 
intensity levels. Subsequently, the value of fixed assets (buildings) per farm (in EUR) was used as an 
appropriate result indicator of deadweight loss effects. 
5 Given that the RDP support is project based, the start of granting actual support usually does not correspond 
with the actual start of the financial period (i.e. 2000), and often is delayed because of the time needed to 
setup the granting system at country and/or regional level and the actual selection of the submitted projects. 
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farms is divided into supported farms and non-supported farms. A balanced panel for both sub-
groups is constructed for 2001 and 2007. 
Given that the main focus of the AFP are milk and beef sectors, 1333 bookkeeping farms 
specialising in milk/beef production are selected. The balanced panel we employ in the empirical 
analysis consists of 101 milk/beef farms supported by the AFP and 1232 non-supported farms, of 
which 526 were located in high AFP regions (Nordfriesland (NF) and Schleswig-Flensburg (SF)), 
and 705 were located in other (“non-affected”) regions.6 
5.2 Inter-firm substitution effects 
In order to estimate the inter-firm effects we exploit information of non-beneficiaries. As the 
intensity of the AFP was the highest in two neighbouring sub-regions of Schleswig-Holstein (i.e. NF 
and SF), we expect that in these two regions the probability of positive/negative indirect inter-firm 
impact of the programme on non-beneficiaries was also the highest compared to other sub-
regions. The economic performance of non-participants in NF and SF regions can be therefore 
described as a result of a “non-intended selection into programme” implemented in a given region. 
We measure the economic performance of farms using profit per farm, economic corrected profit, 
milk production, corrected profit per person fully employed (AK), corrected profit per family labour, 
standard profit per fully employed, and standard profit per family labour.  
The estimated results show that profits per farm among programme non-beneficiaries located in 
regions with low AFP intensity  increased by EUR +41,371 between 2001 and 2007, whereas in the 
group of matched farms (non-beneficiaries) in high AFP regions it increased by (EUR +37,824 
(Table 1). The estimated substitution effects suggest a slight deterioration in the economic 
performance of farms, which did not receive programme support (programme non-beneficiaries), 
but were located in a close neighbourhood of those who received support, i.e. through a reduction 
of profit by EUR -3,547 (-3%) per farm on average. Similar negative substitution effects of the AFP 
affecting non-programme participants located in high AFP regions were found also for corrected 
profit, milk production, corrected profit per person fully employed (AK), corrected profit per family 
labour, standard profit per fully employed, and standard profit per family labour.  
The negative inter-firm effects on the economic performance of farms could have occurred due to 
many factors. One possible explanation is that agricultural farms, which were directly supported by 
the AFP, considerably increased their demand for specific inputs, e.g. land (pastures or arable 
land), thus leading to an increase in input (e.g. land) prices. Indeed, while the leasing price for 
agricultural land remained at the same level in the regions where support from the AFP was very 
intensive, it dropped by 7.3% in those regions, where the programme was not implemented or the 
intensity of the AFP implementation was low7. Other possible channel, through which the AFP may 
have affected non-beneficiaries, is crowding out of funding opportunities (e.g. bank loans). First, 
funds available on the market may relocate from non-beneficiaries to beneficiaries' investments. 
Second, when the deadweight effect of support is high, the support may stimulate beneficiaries' 
private spending on off-farm assets (leverage effects), and under certain conditions increase price 
of those assets for non-beneficiaries. Both effects may reduce non-beneficiaries investment activity 
(either farm or off-farm), thus leading to a lower performance. 
                                                            
6 For specification test results see Appendix A1. 
7 Obviously, the AFP lead to an increase of economic capacities of these farms that could later afford to pay a 
higher rental or sale price for land. 
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These results provide empirical evidence of inter-firm crowding out effects of investment support. 
Although, the support may improve performance of beneficiaries, it has a negative impact on non-
beneficiaries, implying that the overall effect of the AFP is ambiguous. A second important 
implication of the results is that the estimation of the deadweight effects could be biased, if we 
would not control for affected firms in the counterfactual non-beneficiary group. 
5.3 Deadweight loss 
Results from the previous section suggest considerable inter-firm substitution effects, which would 
yield biased estimates of deadweight effects using the full sample. In order to eliminate this bias, 
all programme non-beneficiaries located in regions with high programme intensity, i.e. NF and SF 
were dropped from further analysis, and the AFP effects were re-estimated. The adjusted panel 
consists of 244 farms,8 83 of which were programme beneficiaries and 161 non-beneficiaries. For 
comparison purposes, we also include results for the full sample (376 farms). This will allow us to 
quantify the underestimation because of the deadweight effect, when not controlling for the bias. 
We estimate the deadweight effect using variable farm assets as, according to the theoretical 
literature, any change in farm assets should be a result of investment undertaken by farm. 
According to the results reported in Table 2, there is a substantial deadweight loss linked to farm 
assets of the AFP implemented in Schleswig-Holstein.9 For the full sample, where we do not control 
for inter-firm substitution effect, the value of farm assets in the matched (control) group of non-
beneficiaries increased by 86% compared with the base year (prior to the programme). At the 
same time, the value of farm assets in the group of programme beneficiaries increased by 92%, 
implying that the estimated deadweight effects were as high as 82% (the ratio of 60,552 
EUR/73,487 EUR). 
When controlling for the inter-firm substitution effect, the deadweight effects increase to 99% (or 
the ratio of 71,939 EUR/72,329 EUR). In the control group of the matched programme non-
beneficiaries, the value of farm assets increased over-proportionally by 71,939 EUR (i.e. by 
126.8%), compared to the group of farms supported by the AFP (72,329 EUR; +93.2%). This 
implies that, due to prevailing economic conditions affecting the performance of all milk producers, 
similar investments in the examined period would have been undertaken also without the AFP 
support, eventually due to favourable economic conditions for dairy farms (i.e. significant increase 
in milk price). These results also suggest that, if we would not control for the bias, the deadweight 
loss would be underestimated by around 17 percent.  
Theoretical expectations imply that the deadweight loss may occur either in the absence of market 
imperfections or due to inter-temporal substitution of investments. The presence of high 
deadweight loss may imply that farms in the Schleswig-Holstein region do not face significant 
market imperfections, such as credit constrain. Our results support the hypothesis that farms are 
                                                            
8 Due to dropping of programme non-participants located in regions with the highest programme intensity 
from the data base, i.e. regions NF and S-F, and those farms where modernisation of farm buildings did not 
take place, only 161 non-beneficiary farms were left to re-estimate deadweight loss effects. 
 
9 For specification test results se Appendix A2. 
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able to undertake all profitable investment opportunities also without the RDP. They do not 
significantly increase their investment level, when support becomes available. 
Further, given that we cover a 7 year period, farms may have changed the timing of investments 
within the study period, by taking into consideration the period of programme implementation. To 
comply with program requirements and application procedure, farms may have shifted forward or 
backward investment within the study period. However, due to insufficient number of observations, 
we cannot control for time variation of investments and hence quantify this effect. On the other 
hand, our results do not support the hypothesis that farms inter-temporally substitute investments 
beyond the study period (i.e. after 2007). To have a shift in investments from the post-study 
period to study period, we would need to observe an increase in beneficiaries' investments relative 
to non-beneficiaries investments over the study period. As reported in Table 2, the assets of non-
beneficiaries increase by 126.8% over the period of 2001-2007, whereas for beneficiaries the 
increase in farm asset value was 93.2%, rejecting the hypothesis of inter-temporal investment 
substitution. Overall, our results imply that distortions in the agricultural capital markets are 
minimal and, de facto, the AFP investment support represents an income transfer to farms. As 
discussed in the next section, an indirect consequence of the support is an increase in off-farm 
related spending. 
5.4 Robustness tests 
To check the robustness of the deadweight effects, we estimate the leverage effect. The leverage 
effect occurs if public funding induces off-farm spending of programme beneficiaries. Overall, the 
support will be reflected either as an increase in farm assets, or as a change in other farm 
household expenditures which are not linked to farm activities. Thus, the leverage effect is an 
indirect test of the deadweight effect. It can be expected that in the case of significant deadweight 
effects, the leverage effect will be positive and significant.  
The leverage effect is identified by comparing the supported and non-supported farms before and 
after the programme. First, we select individual units j supported by the RDP. Second, we identify 
a control group matching with j units (identical distribution of covariates) in period t’ (i.e. prior to 
j’s access to the programme). We use three indicators to measure private off-farm spending: (i) 
money transfer from farm to farm households for living expenses, (ii) money transfers from farm 
to building of private non-farm assets and (iii) total money transfers from farm to farm household. 
We expect that in the case of significant leverage effects the calculated DID-ATT would be positive 
and significant, indirectly implying the presence of deadweight effects. 
The leverage effect can be considered as an indirect consequence of the AFP being diverted from 
farm investments to off-farm investments. Given the fact that we found a significant deadweight 
loss, we expect that the AFP would have a substantial impact on private off-farm spending. As 
above, for comparison purposes we also include results for the full sample and for the subsample, 
where we control for the bias related to inter-firm effects.  
The results reported in Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 indicate considerable leverage effects.10 For 
the full sample, the AFP brought about significant transfers of funds from farms to farm 
households. On average, additional money transfers from farm to farm households for living 
expenses increased by EUR +4,653 (12.8%) (Table 3) for beneficiaries, compared to EUR +3,178 
                                                            
10 For specification test results see Appendix A3. 
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(9.4%) for non-beneficiaries (Table 4), while additional total money transfers from farms to farm 
households expanded by EUR +14,550 (19.9%) (Table 5). These results suggest that the 
propensity to consume among farms that received support from the AFP was much higher 
compared to non-beneficiaries (i.e. the programme leverage effect was substantial).  
As expected, the results, which are based on a reduction of the selection bias (originating from the 
inter-firm substitution effects), show that the AFP has slightly higher leverage effects compared to 
former outcomes, in particular for money transfers from farm to farm household for building of 
private non-farm assets and total money transfers from farm to farm households. Indeed, the AFP 
was found to substantially induce private off-farm spending among programme beneficiaries, i.e. 
participation in the AFP led to: (i) an increase in money transfers from farm to farm household for 
living expenses compared to similar non-beneficiaries by approximately +4,659 EUR (13.2%) per 
farm (Table 3); (ii) an increase in money transfers from farm to farm household for building of 
private non-farm assets by approximately +9,526 EUR (27.7%) per farm (Table 4); and (iii) an 
increase in the total money transfer from farms to farm households by approximately +22,702 EUR 
(27.0%) (Table 5). These results indirectly confirm presence of the deadweight loss of the AFP 
implemented in Schleswig-Holstein. The AFP significantly increases off-farm household spending 
boosted by resources freed from the substitution of on-farm private investments with the public 
support. 
5.5 Sensitivity analysis 
Due to unobserved variables, which simultaneously affect both the assignment to treatment and 
outcome, a hidden bias may arise. Unobservable heterogeneity can substantially affect the 
estimated results of programme effects. While the propensity score matching assumes conditional 
independencies to exclude the problem of unobservable heterogeneity, the unconfoundedness 
assumption holds even when two units with the same values for observed characteristics differ in 
their treatment choices (participation or non-participation). The difference in their choices may be 
driven by differences in the unobserved characteristics that themselves are unrelated to the 
outcomes of interest (Imbens, 2003). Yet, if there are unobserved variables that simultaneously 
affect the assignment into the programme and the outcome variable, a hidden bias might arise to 
which matching estimators are not robust (Rosenbaum, 2002; Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005; 
Becker and Caliendo, 2007).  
In our study the presence of hidden bias is addressed by conducting sensitivity analysis by 
employing the bounding approach proposed by Rosenbaum (2002). It allows to determine how 
much hidden bias would need to be present to render plausible null hypothesis of no effect or, in 
another words, how strongly an unmeasured variable must influence the selection process in order 
to undermine the implications of matching analysis (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2005). As stated in 
Becker and Caliendo (2007), the bounding approach does not test the unconfoundedness 
assumption itself, because this would amount to testing that there are no (unobserved) variables 
that influence the selection into the programme, but instead, this approach provides evidence 
about the degree to which any significant results hinge on this untestable assumption. Sensitivity 
analysis is applied using the Mantel and Haenszel (1959) test statistics suggested by Aakvik 
(2001). 
We also conduct other sensitivity analysis to test the stability of the obtained results. With respect 
to the specification of the propensity score, the number of selected companies, changes in 
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covariates, changes in parameters of balancing properties, etc. Given a standardised set of 
variables describing the characteristics of agricultural enterprises (FADN data), one of the most 
important sensitivity tests was to find the minimal/optimal set of conditional variables to be 
included in the estimations. 
We perform sensitivity analysis using the Rosenbaum bounding approach methodology as 
described above. The sensitivity analysis results suggest that the estimated AFP effects are rather 
sensitive to hidden bias (Table 6). A presence of a hidden bias of the magnitude of 5-10%, i.e. 
increasing the odds ratio from 1 to 1.05-1.10, would make the obtained results statistically 
insignificant. This relatively high sensitivity of the obtained results could have been caused by a 
relatively small number of observations used in these tests (99 matched pairs). Yet, the sensitivity 
tests provide only additional information regarding effects’ stability, but do not question the overall 
validity of the obtained results. 
 
6 CONCLUSIONS 
Investment support to farms is one of the main measures within the Rural Development 
Programme and an essential component of the productivity enhancing strategy within the Common 
Agricultural Policy in the EU. As part of the RDP, more than 11 billion Euro (representing 11.5 
percent of the total RDP budget) have been spent for supporting farm investment. Form a policy 
perspective, a key question is the extent to which the public support actually stimulates private 
investment, and what are the second order induced effects on productivity, employment, 
environment, etc. 
The main objective of the present paper is to estimate the extent to which the RDP investment 
support has a complementary or a substitutionary effect on farm investments. In order to answer 
this question, we attempt to quantify the potential deadweight loss by estimating the extent to 
which the RDP beneficiaries would have undertaken comparable investments also without the RDP 
support. As a robustness check, we also estimate the impact of the RDP on private off-farm 
spending (the so called leverage effect), and the inter-firm substitution effects of the RDP 
investment support, attempting to account for the potential impact of the support on non-
beneficiaries. 
In the empirical analyses we employ the propensity score matching (PSM) approach, which allows 
us to address several important sources of bias, from which many previous studies suffer. In 
particular, by employing the PSM estimator we are able to address the selection bias, the 
simultaneity bias, and functional form misspecification. Estimation of a deadweight loss is 
performed on the basis of the PSM approach in 2-stages by correcting for the inter-firm 
substitution effect, i.e. by dropping the programme affected non-supported farms from the sample. 
We base our estimation on a sample of 1333 farms from Schleswig-Holstein region (Germany) for 
the period 2001-2008.  
We find that the deadweight loss of the RDP on farm investment is around 100%, implying that 
firm investment would have been undertaken also without the support. According to the theoretical 
hypothesis, these results suggest that farms in Schleswig-Holstein are not credit constrained, and 
hence do not significantly increase their investment level, when investment support becomes 
available. These results imply that credit market distortions are not significant. In contrast, the 
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RDP investment support represents an income transfer to farm households by significantly 
increasing private off-farm spending. Further, given that we cover a 7 year period from 2001 to 
2007, farms may have brought forward their investments. However, our results do not support the 
inter-temporal investment substitution hypothesis. These results are new, as the deadweight loss 
has not been studied in the context of the RDP in Germany before. 
Our results have important policy implications. Identifying the inter-firm adjustments of the RDP 
investment support is important for at least two reasons: (i) it facilitates assessment of the 
crowding out effect; and (ii) it allows to correct for the bias related to estimation of deadweight 
effects arising from application of traditional evaluation techniques. 
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Table 1: Inter-firm substitution of the AFP on farm profits 
  Profit per farm (EUR)   DID (2007-2001) 
 
No. of observations 
2001 2007   EUR % 
Unmatched P=1  526 46,349 84,703   38,354 83 
Unmatched P=0  705 40,531 83,034   42,503 105 
Matched M =1  517 45,933 83,757   37,824 82 
Matched M= 0  677 48,559 89,930   41,371 85 
ATT  -2,626 -6,172   -3,546 -3 
 
Table 2: Deadweight loss of the AFP on farm assets 
Full sample Sub-sample with excluded programme affected beneficiaries 
2001 2007 DID (2001-2007)  2001 2007 
DID (2001-
2007) 
 No. of 
observations EUR (%) 
No. of 
observations EUR (%) 
Participants (P=1) 83 80,058 153,545 73,487 83 80,058 153,545 73,487 
Non-participants (P=0) 293 57,379 108,539 51,160 161 51,607 107,265 55,658 
Matched participants 
(M=1)  83 80,058 153,545
73,487 
(+92%) 78 77,609 149,938 
72,329 
(+93.2%) 
Matched non-participants 
(M=0) 263 70,181 130,733
60,552 
(+86%) 155 56,704 128,643 
71,939 
(+126.8%) 
Deadweight loss    93%    100% 
 
Table 3: Leverage effects of the AFP to farm household living expenses 
Full sample Sub-sample with excluded programme affected beneficiaries 
DID (2007-2001) DID (2007-2001) 
  
No. of 
observations EUR % 
No. of 
observations EUR % 
Unmatched P=1 101 13,738 45.7 101 13,738 45.7 
Unmatched P=0 1,232 7,824 31.9 706 7,956 32.1 
Matched M= 1  101 13,738 45.7 99 13,869 45.8 
Matched M= 0  1,067 9,085 32.9 662 9,209 32.5 
ATT   4,653 12.8   4,659 13.2 
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Table 4: Leverage effects of the AFP to building of private non-farm assets  
Full sample Sub-sample with excluded programme affected beneficiaries 
DID (2007-2001) DID (2007-2001) 
  
No. of 
observations EUR % 
No. of 
observations EUR % 
Unmatched P=1 101 29,855 161.8 101 29,855 161.8 
Unmatched P=0 1,232 20,294 174.5 706 16,483 143.5 
Matched M= 1  101 29,855 161.8 99 29,307 158.1 
Matched M= 0  1,067 26,677 152.4 662 19,782 130.4 
ATT   3,178 9.4   9,526 27.7 
 
Table 5: Leverage effects of the AFP to farm household  
Full sample Sub-sample with excluded programme affected beneficiaries 
DID (2007-2001) DID (2007-2001) 
  
No. of 
observations EUR % 
No. of 
observations EUR % 
Unmatched P=1 101 62,471 82.8 101 62,471 82.8 
Unmatched P=0 1,232 38,100 62.1 706 32,829 53.6 
Matched M= 1  101 62,471 82.8 99 62,413 82.6 
Matched M= 0  1,067 47,919 62.9 662 39,711 55.6 
ATT   14,550 19.9   22,702 27.0 
 
Table 6: Rosenbaum bounds for milk production (2007, N = 99 matched pairs)  
Significance level Hodges-Lehmann point estimate Confidence interval (95%) 
Gamma* 
Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound  Lower bound  Upper bound  Lower bound 
1 0.070 0.070 38,324 38,324 -12,676 100,171 
1.05 0.103 0.046 32,668 45,248 -16,715 105,753 
1.1 0.143 0.029 26,536 50,671 -23,047 111,138 
1.15 0.191 0.019 20,495 56,805 -28,464 118,174 
1.2 0.244 0.012 15,767 63,807 -32,436 123,938 
1.25 0.302 0.007 11,304 69,335 -36,879 129,455 
1.3 0.362 0.004 7,545 74,079 -42,561 135,367 
1.35 0.424 0.003 4,107 78,951 -47,675 140,823 
1.4 0.485 0.002 838 83,388 -51,330 146,999 
1.45 0.545 0.001 -3,442 87,392 -55,648 151,453 
1.5 0.601 0.001 -7,665 91,733 -59,844 156,474 
2 0.932 0.000 -35,916 128,711 -94,189 207,359 
2.05 0.945 0.000 -38,845 131,215 -98,107 212,718 
2.2 0.971 0.000 -48,007 141,362 -105,729 226,869 
2.5 0.993 0.000 -62,006 158,358 -117,343 246,818 
2.55 0.995 0.000 -65,351 161,662 -119,505 249,272 
2.95 0.999 0.000 -79,928 183,363 -134,223 277,348 
3 0.999 0.000 -81,039 187,673 -137,031 280,889 
Note: * Gamma = log odds of differential assignment due to unobserved factors 
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Appendix A1: Specification test results  
Estimation of a logit function 
After cleaning the data base (by dropping from the set of potential control those agricultural farms 
which were found to be affected by the AFP) logit function was estimated using 807 observations 
on bookkeeping farms (Schleswig-Holstein) specialised in milk production, of which 101 were 
programme beneficiaries and 706 programme non-beneficiaries. The list of variables (38) that 
determine both programme participation and outcomes and were included as relevant covariates is 
provided in Table A1-1. Among variables used to match programme beneficiaries with programme 
non-beneficiaries an important one was the former level of support obtained from RDP previously 
implemented in Schleswig-Holstein (vsupp). Inclusion of this variable allowed to overcome a 
problem mentioned in many evaluation studies concerning the non-existence of non-supported 
farms (by the current and previous RDP) in a specific programme area. 
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Table A1-1: List of variables selected as covariates to estimation of logit function 
 
List of variables 
v1025i2 Value of fixed assets – buildings 
v1030i2 Operating facilities (value)  
v1031i2 Machinery (value)  
v1091i2 Cattle (value)  
v1110i2 Inventory stock  
v1449i2 Capital stock (value)  
v2129i5 Revenues beef/cattle/milk sales  
v2705i5 Purchased concentrated feed for cattle 
v2799i5 Labour costs (total) 
v4116i2     Milk yield (per cow)     
v5111i2       Fem. Calves > 0.5 year  
v5112i2       Fem. Calves > 0.5 and < 1 year  
v5113i2       Fem. Cattle > 1 and < 2 years  
v5114i2       Breeding Heifer  
v5115i2        Heifer  
v5116i2      Milk cows   
v5117i2      Suckler cows    
v5118i2      Slaughter cows 
v5120i2       Male calves > 0.5    
v5121i2      Male cattle > 0.5 and < 1 year    
v5122i2       Male cattle > 1 and < 1.5 years  
v5123i2      Male cattle > 1.5 and < 2 years  
v5124i2      Male cattle > 2 years  
v5125i2      Breeding bulls  
v6104i7      Pasture area  
v6119i7   Agricultural area (total)  
v7098i3       Non-family labour  
v7099i3      Labour total  
vmilkprod     Milk production  
v8026i2      Excess milk quota  
v9001      Equity capital formation  
v9003  v9003  
v9005     Labour productivity (cattle/beef/milk per total labour)    
v9006      Labour productivity (milk per total labour)    
profit01 profit01 
v9004       Adjusted equity capital formation 
profit_co~01     Profit per farm (adjusted)     
v8213i2 Earnings from non-self-employment    
v2381i5      Interest subsidy to investment    
vsupp  Obtained level of support from previous programmes 
 
 
IATRC 2013 Symposium: "Productivity and Its Impacts on Global Trade" 
Co-sponsored by the IATRC and the European Commission, 2-4 June, Seville 
 
 
24 
Michalek, Ciaian, Kancs 
FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE OF DEADWEIGHT LOSS OF INVESTMENT SUPPORT POLICIES 
 
 
 
Table A1-2: Results of a logit function estimation 
 
In the next step results of a logit function estimation were used to derive for all agricultural farms 
specialised in milk production their individual probability (propensity scores) of participation in the 
AFP measure. 
Selection of a matching algorithm 
As the quality of a given matching algorithm depends strongly on a data set, the selection of a 
relevant matching technique was carried out using three independent criteria: i) standardised bias 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985); ii) t–test (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985); and iii) joint significance 
and pseudo R² (Sianesi, 2004). 
Similar to the cases of other assessments of programme impact we found that the best results 
were achieved by using an iterative procedure (e.g. linear search) aimed at minimisation of the 
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calculated standardised bias11 (after matching) and applying min{min} as the main selection 
criterion. In all considered cases (various matching algorithms)12 an optimal solution could easily 
be found due to local/global convexity of the objective function with respect to function parameters 
under each matching algorithm (e.g. radius magnitude in radius matching; or number of nearest 
neighbours in nearest neighbour matching). An overview of results obtained using different 
matching algorithms for the case of re-estimation of effects of the AFP in Schleswig-Holstein is 
provided in Table A1-3. 
Table A1-3: Selection of a matching algorithm 
Matching method Matching parameters Estimated standardised bias  (after matching) 
Nearest neighbours N ( 8 ) 4.30 
 N ( 9 ) 3.90 
 N ( 10 ) 4.02 
Caliper ( 0.08 ) 3.76 
 ( 0.07 ) Selected (min) =>     3.70 
 ( 0.06 ) 3.95 
Kernel normal bw ( 0.03 ) 4.22 
 bw ( 0.04 ) 3.99 
 bw ( 0.05 ) 4.13 
Kernel biweight  4.65 
Kernel epanechnikov bw ( 0.11 ) 3.92 
 bw ( 0.09) 3.76 
 bw ( 0.08 ) 3.89 
 
The lowest estimated standardised bias (after matching) was found in the case of caliper matching 
(0.07). This matching algorithm was therefore used in the further work for assessment of the effect 
of the AFP on direct programme beneficiaries13.   
The application of the above procedure and common support restrictions resulted in dropping 46 
farms (2 programme supported and 44 non-programme supported) from further analysis, thus 
selecting comparable 761 farms of which: 99 were programme participants and 662 were 
programme non-participants (Table A1-4). 
                                                            
11 The standardised bias is the difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated (full or matched) 
sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-
treated groups (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). 
12 This does not apply to local linear weighting function matching which first smoothes the outcome and then 
performs nearest neighbour matching. In this case more controls are used to calculate the counterfactual 
outcome than the nearest neighbour only (Leuven and Sianesi, 2007). 
13 The caliper matching algorithm (0.07) was also found to perform satisfactory concerning other important 
Selection criteria, i.e. balancing property and pseudo R² tests. 
 
 
IATRC 2013 Symposium: "Productivity and Its Impacts on Global Trade" 
Co-sponsored by the IATRC and the European Commission, 2-4 June, Seville 
 
 
26 
Michalek, Ciaian, Kancs 
FIRM-LEVEL EVIDENCE OF DEADWEIGHT LOSS OF INVESTMENT SUPPORT POLICIES 
 
 
 
Table A1-4: Overview of the matched sample 
Common support 
Treatment 
Off support On support 
Total 
Untreated 
Treated 
44 
2 
662 
99 
706 
101 
Total 46 761 807 
 
Verification of the balancing property of matched variables  
One of the important criteria applied for the assessment of the matching’s quality can be the 
comparison of mean values of relevant covariates in both groups of farms (programme 
beneficiaries vs controls) before and after matching (using the selected matching algorithm). It is 
expected that application of the selected matching algorithm (here: caliper matching 0.07) will lead 
to a considerable reduction of original differences in mean values of each individual variable 
included as a covariate in the logit function, between supported and non-supported groups of 
farms.  
The comparison of mean values for all variables included as covariates in the estimated logit 
function in both groups of farms before and after matching is presented in Table A1-5. The results 
show that for almost all variables (except for the variables: number of breeding heifers, non-family 
labour and earnings from non-self employment) the selected matching procedure resulted in a 
significant reduction of differences in variables’ means among both groups of farms, i.e. 
beneficiaries vs. controls thus making both groups of farms much more comparable. Furthermore, 
after the implementation of above matching procedure the estimated standardised selection bias 
could be reduced from 25.6 (before matching) to 3.70 (after matching), i.e. it dropped by 86%. At 
the same time pseudo R² decreased as expected, i.e. dropped from 0.201 to 0.119 respectively, 
i.e. by 41%.  
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Table A1-5: Balancing property tests 
Variable-Name variable Sample Treated Control %bias |bias| 
Unmatched 78645 64423 26.4  Long-term assets – buildings  v1025i2_01 
Matched 77665 77949 -0.5 98 
Unmatched 17355 16524 4.4  Operating facilities (value)  v1030i2_01 
Matched 17400 17474 -0.4 91.1 
Unmatched 28285 32066 -16.3  Machinery (value)  v1031i2_01 
Matched 28410 28297 0.5 97 
Unmatched 1.10E+05 93309 43.7  Cattle (value)  v1091i2_01 
Matched 1.10E+05 1.10E+05 4.8 89 
Unmatched 174.12 93.661 4.3  Inventory stock  v1110i2_01 
Matched 177.64 115.81 3.3 23.2 
Unmatched 6.80E+05 6.60E+05 5.9  Capital stock (value)  v1449i2_01 
Matched 6.80E+05 6.70E+05 2.8 52.3 
Unmatched 2.30E+05 1.70E+05 63.7  Revenues beef/cattle/milk sales  v2129i5_01 
Matched 2.20E+05 2.20E+05 6.3 90.1 
Unmatched -29362 -26278 -16  Purchased concentrated feed for 
cattle 
v2705i5_01 
Matched -29955 -30484 2.7 82.9 
Unmatched -6808.1 -5562.6 -14.9  Labour costs (total) v2799i5_01 
Matched -6815.2 -6229.6 -7 53 
Unmatched 7351.9 6572 64  Milk yield (per cow)     v4116i2_01   
Matched 7340.2 7283.7 4.6 92.8 
Unmatched 17.089 13.544 35.7  Fem. Calves > 0.5 year  v5111i2_01       
Matched 16.929 16.114 8.2 77 
Unmatched 21.911 19.007 25.4  Fem. Calves > 0.5 and < 1 year  v5112i2_01       
Matched 21.788 21.116 5.9 76.9 
Unmatched 35.119 30.305 32.9  Fem. Cattle > 1 and < 2 years  v5113i2_01       
Matched 35.03 33.67 9.3 71.7 
Unmatched 19.218 19.221 0  Breeding Heifer  v5114i2_01       
Matched 19.222 19.545 -2.6 -10189.4 
Unmatched 0.18812 0.30028 -6.4  Heifer  v5115i2_01        
Matched 0.19192 0.15312 2.2 65.4 
Unmatched 71.861 61.584 38.6  Milk cows   v5116i2_01      
Matched 71.404 70.437 3.6 90.6 
Unmatched 0.13861 0.25212 -6.8  Suckler cows    v5117i2_01      
Matched 0.14141 0.12746 0.8 87.7 
Unmatched 2.4158 1.5312 20.9  Slaughter cows v5118i2 _01     
Matched 2.4646 2.2616 4.8 77 
Unmatched 14.762 10.374 41.7  Male calves > 0.5    v5120i2 _01      
Matched 14.525 14.631 -1 97.6 
Unmatched 19.465 13.006 44.7  Male cattle > 0.5 and < 1 year    v5121i2 _01     
Matched 19.364 20.036 -4.7 89.6 
Unmatched 16.04 9.7578 43.3  Male cattle > 1 and < 1.5 years  v5122i2_01       
Matched 15.818 15.918 -0.7 98.4 
Unmatched 4.6337 2.6785 26.3  Male cattle > 1.5 and < 2 years  v5123i2_01      
Matched 4.5556 4.4296 1.7 93.6 
       
Unmatched 0.05941 0.2762 -15.4  Male cattle > 2 years  v5124i2 _01     
Matched 0.0404 0.04363 -0.2 98.5 
Unmatched 0.63366 0.61331 2.4  Breeding bulls  v5125i2 _01     
Matched 0.60606 0.60544 0.1 96.9 
Unmatched 48.231 39.04 36.1  Pasture area (ha) v6104i7 _01     
Matched 47.908 45.685 8.7 75.8 
Unmatched 94.335 83.954 26.9  Agricultural area (total)  (ha) v6119i7 _01  
Matched 93.834 92.596 3.2 88.1 
Unmatched 0.17337 0.18493 -2.5  Non-family labour  (AK) v7098i3_01       
Matched 0.17586 0.14761 6.2 -144.3 
Unmatched 1.7463 1.7426 0.5  Labour total  (AK) v7099i3_01      
Matched 1.7523 1.7325 2.7 -429.2 
Unmatched 5.30E+05 4.10E+05 59  Milk production  vmilkprod_01 
Matched 5.30E+05 5.10E+05 5.9 90.1 
Unmatched 22801 15735 20.8  Excess milk quota  v8026i2_01      
Matched 23064 20533 7.4 64.2 
Unmatched 1.60E+05 1.30E+05 23.5  Equity capital formation  v9001 _01    
Matched 1.60E+05 1.50E+05 5.4 77.1 
Unmatched -5374.4 -4303 -13.2  v9003  v9003_01 
Matched -5387.1 -4827.3 -6.9 47.8 
Labour productivity (cattle/beef / v9005_01  Unmatched 1.40E+05 1.10E+05 69.6  
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milk per total labour)    Matched 1.40E+05 1.40E+05 0.5 99.2 
Unmatched 3303 2487.6 64.8  Labour productivity (milk per 
total labour)    
v9006 _01    
Matched 3266.7 3255.9 0.9 98.7 
Unmatched 54629 40518 48.8  profit01 profit01 
Matched 54634 52293 8.1 83.4 
Unmatched 4818 2168.3 5.6  Adjusted equity capital formation v9004 _01    
Matched 4847.6 6284 -3 45.8 
Unmatched 35728 23889 35.3  Profit per farm (adjusted)     profit_co~01     
Matched 35855 34159 5.1 85.7 
Unmatched 9.8107 93.767 -10.2  Earnings from self-employment    v8212i2 
Matched 10.009 11.991 -0.2 97.6 
Unmatched 466.01 534.24 -2.3  Earnings from non-self-
employment    
v8213i2      
Matched 475 389.37 2.9 -25.5 
Unmatched 9340 8685.3 5.8  vsupp_01 vsupp  
Matched 9206.3 8954.3 2.2 61.5 
 
Appendix A2: Specification test results of the deadweight loss 
Given the previously calculated individual propensity scores for programme beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries, and after imposing restrictions on the common support region, a new relevant 
matching technique was selected (a truncated data base consisted of 244 observations of which 83 
observations were on programme beneficiaries and 161 on programme beneficiaries), according to 
three independent criteria: i) standardised bias (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985); ii) t–test 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985); and iii) joint significance and pseudo R² (Sianesi, 2004). As a 
result, a kernel (normal kernel, b.w. 0.08) was found to be the “best” matching technique and was 
selected for calculation of the deadweight loss effects of the AFP.  
The comparison of mean values for all variables included as covariates in the estimated logit 
function in both groups of farms before and after matching is presented in Table A2-1. The results 
show that for almost all variables (except for the number of breeding heifers and total labour) the 
selected matching procedure resulted in a significant reduction of differences in variables’ means 
among both groups of farms, i.e. beneficiaries vs. controls thus making both groups of farms much 
more comparable. 
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Table A2-1: Balancing property tests (deadweight loss effect) 
Variable-Name variable Sample Treated Control %bias |bias| 
Unmatched 80059 51608 57.2  Long-term assets – 
buildings  v1025i2_01 Matched 77609 56705 42 26.5 
Unmatched 16750 17352 -3.5  
Operating facilities (value)  v1030i2_01 Matched 16952 17281 -1.9 45.3 
Unmatched 27561 35370 -36.9  
Machinery (value)  v1031i2_01 Matched 27622 32227 -21.8 41 
Unmatched 1.10E+05 1.00E+05 23.1  
Cattle (value)  v1091i2_01 Matched 1.10E+05 1.10E+05 -7.8 66.1 
Unmatched 211.8 0 15.5  
Inventory stock  v1110i2_01 Matched 225.4 0 16.5 -6.4 
Unmatched 6.70E+05 6.20E+05 14  
Capital stock (value)  v1449i2_01 Matched 6.60E+05 6.40E+05 4.4 68.6 
Unmatched 2.20E+05 1.90E+05 37  Revenues 
beef/cattle/milk sales  v2129i5_01 Matched 2.20E+05 2.20E+05 -6.3 83 
Unmatched -29142 -28927 -1.1  Purchased concentrated 
feed for cattle v2705i5_01 Matched -30490 -31376 4.6 -313.5 
Unmatched -6428.1 -5904.8 -6  
Labour costs (total) v2799i5_01 Matched -6232.8 -6232.2 0 99.9 
Unmatched 7330.4 6846.9 38.4  
Milk yield (per cow)     v4116i2_01   Matched 7244.4 7231.2 1.1 97.3 
Unmatched 17.181 14.012 31.2  
Fem. Calves > 0.5 year  v5111i2_01       Matched 16.59 17.002 -4.1 87 
Unmatched 21.855 20.205 14.1  Fem. Calves > 0.5 and < 1 
year  v5112i2_01       Matched 21.372 21.056 2.7 80.9 
Unmatched 35.096 32.168 19.5  Fem. Cattle > 1 and < 2 
years  v5113i2_01       Matched 34.385 33.672 4.7 75.7 
Unmatched 19.06 20.919 -14.2  
Breeding Heifer  v5114i2_01       Matched 19.205 21.536 -17.9 -25.4 
Unmatched 0.22892 0.13043 12.1  
Heifer  v5115i2_01        Matched 0.24359 0.07922 20.2 -66.9 
Unmatched 71.096 64.745 23.6  
Milk cows   v5116i2_01      Matched 69.859 70.878 -3.8 84 
Unmatched 0.16867 0.39752 -9.5  
Suckler cows    v5117i2_01      Matched 0.17949 0.2351 -2.3 75.7 
Unmatched 2.3253 1.4472 21.4  
Slaughter cows v5118i2 _01     Matched 2.2179 2.2264 -0.2 99 
Unmatched 14.735 11.708 26.8  
Male calves > 0.5    v5120i2 _01      Matched 14.218 15.16 -8.3 68.9 
Unmatched 19.542 13.969 38.1  Male cattle > 0.5 and < 1 
year    v5121i2 _01     Matched 19.359 18.654 4.8 87.3 
Unmatched 16.06 11.143 30.4  Male cattle > 1 and < 1.5 
years  v5122i2_01       Matched 15.821 16.31 -3 90 
Unmatched 4.506 3.1615 18.3  Male cattle > 1.5 and < 2 
years  v5123i2_01      Matched 4.3974 4.686 -3.9 78.5 
Male cattle > 2 years  v5124i2 _01     Unmatched 0.06024 0.34161 -14.1  
Male cattle > 2 years  v5124i2 _01     Matched 0.03846 0.04948 -0.6 96.1 
Breeding bulls  v5125i2 _01     Unmatched 0.61446 0.58385 3.7  
Breeding bulls  v5125i2 _01     Matched 0.58974 0.57852 1.3 63.3 
Pasture area (ha) v6104i7 _01     Unmatched 49.093 40.81 29.9  
Pasture area (ha) v6104i7 _01     Matched 48.201 44.891 11.9 60 
Agricultural area (total)  
(ha) v6119i7 _01  Unmatched 93.311 89.865 9.2  
Agricultural area (total)  
(ha) v6119i7 _01  Matched 91.975 94.859 -7.7 16.3 
Non-family labour  (AK) v7098i3_01       Unmatched 0.15614 0.20634 -11.2  
Non-family labour  (AK) v7098i3_01       Matched 0.13923 0.18349 -9.9 11.8 
Labour total  (AK) v7099i3_01      Unmatched 1.6827 1.7401 -8.3  
Labour total  (AK) v7099i3_01      Matched 1.6683 1.785 -16.9 -103.1 
Milk production  vmilkprod_01 Unmatched 5.20E+05 4.50E+05 36.4  
Milk production  vmilkprod_01 Matched 5.10E+05 5.10E+05 -2.5 93.3 
Excess milk quota  v8026i2_01      Unmatched 23110 18986 10.7  
Excess milk quota  v8026i2_01      Matched 21233 21270 -0.1 99.1 
Equity capital formation  v9001 _01    Unmatched 1.60E+05 1.50E+05 7  
Equity capital formation  v9001 _01    Matched 1.50E+05 1.40E+05 8.3 -18.3 
v9003  v9003_01 Unmatched -5010.7 -4587.9 -5  
v9003  v9003_01 Matched -4834.9 -4826.6 -0.1 98 
Labour productivity 
(cattle/beef / milk per 
total labour)    v9005_01  Unmatched 1.40E+05 1.20E+05 49  
Labour productivity v9005_01  Matched 1.40E+05 1.30E+05 11.8 76.4 
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(cattle/beef / milk per 
total labour)    
Labour productivity (milk 
per total labour)    v9006 _01    Unmatched 3339.9 2746.1 47.6  
Labour productivity (milk 
per total labour)    v9006 _01    Matched 3269.4 3113.7 12.5 73.8 
profit01 profit01 Unmatched 53271 44302 28.9  
profit01 profit01 Matched 50921 51098 -0.6 98 
Adjusted equity capital 
formation v9004 _01    Unmatched 5701.7 11245 -7.3  
Adjusted equity capital 
formation v9004 _01    Matched 6079.4 5885 0.3 96.5 
Profit per farm (adjusted)     profit_co~01     Unmatched 34517 25450 28.9  
Profit per farm (adjusted)     profit_co~01     Matched 32722 32037 2.2 92.4 
Earnings from self-
employment    v8212i2 Unmatched 11.938 14.915 -3.1  
Earnings from self-
employment    v8212i2 Matched 12.704 11.316 1.5 53.4 
Earnings from non-self-
employment    v8213i2      Unmatched 540.52 758.7 -5.9  
Earnings from non-self-
employment    v8213i2      Matched 574.63 535.55 1.1 82.1 
vsupp_01 vsupp  Unmatched 9207.8 8598 5.4  
Matched 9007.9 8587.9 3.7 31.1 
vsupp_01 vsupp  
          
 
 
 
